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During the past decade, our government lias embarked upon a
series of great social programs designed to strengthen the free
world a :ainst the rampant forces of intolerance and aggression.
Chief among these are: The European Recovery trogram, the Ritual
Defense Assistance Program, and I oint Four. There are people at
home and abroad who argue that these programs stem from motives
of pecuniary gain and self preservation. True, there may be an
element of enlightened self-interest in each of them, but equally
evident to the unbiased observer is the presence of a mutuality of
interests. The very title of the i4utual Defense Assistance iro-
gram connotes the philosophy of mutual interest in preserving the
status .quo.
I like to think of these pro 'Tarns as experiments in human
relations on an international scale. Certainly, it would be no
exaggeration to say that the Mutual Defense ro ram created human
relations | roblems of substantial magnitude both within our own
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nations, I was closely associated with this program as a member
of the Military Assistance Mission to Belgium during a three year
period, and presume, therefore, to speak with some authority on
the human relations aspects connected therewith. Some of the
statements made with re ard to relationships between the military
departments may appear somewhat biased, not to say indiscreet. In
this regard, I wish to emphasise that any discussion of human re-
lations problems inevitably leads to the disclosure of unpleasant
details; otherwise, there -would be no problems. In any event,
the opinions herein expressed are wholly mine and for which I
take full responsibility.
The introduction delves briefly into the background of
the Mutual Defense Assistance Act. Part I deals with problems
in human relations between Americans involved in the program,
while Part II takes up similar problems arising between Americans
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On April 4> 1949, twelve nations^ comprising the North
Atlantic Alliance Signed the North Atlantic Treaty, The preamble
of the treaty stated its purpose as follows:
The parties to this treaty re-affirm
their faith in the purpose and principles of
the United Nations .they
are resolved to unite their efforts for col-
lective defense and for the preservation of
peace and security.
^
The keynote of the treaty is contained in Article 5
which states :-*
The parties agree that an armed attack
against one or more of them in Europe or North
America shall be considered an attack against
them all each of them will
assist the parties so attacked by such action
as it deems necessary, including the use of
armed force, to restore and maintain the secur-
ity of the North Atlantic area.
United States, Canada, Belgium, Luxembourg, Iceland, Portugal,
Italy, France, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Norway and Denmark.
The iresident's message to Congress dated April 12, 1949* which





The North Atlantic Treaty was the instrument by which the
free world expressed its detemination to resist the intolerable
threat of aggression posed by the Soviet Union, The signatory
nations agreed to join together in assisting any member who be-
came a victim of armed attack. These were inspiring words, but
as several of the member nations pointed out, quite meaningless
in the light of their existing economic and military potentiali-
ties. Their appeals for aid from the United States aroused a
great debate in the Congress which culminated in passage of the
Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. Mrs. Helen Gahagan Douglas,
Con recc ..oman from California, was an articulate defender of the
aid bill. She stated the case for the bill before a committee of
the whole House as follows:
Cur preventative action, as I have already
said is the North Atlantic Treaty. We have joined
with the other signatories in building, through
self help and mutual aid a corimon defense for the
common good. Now our partners in Western Europe
have turned to us for help. Their appeals rise
out of the same conditions that lead to the pro-
posal for the North Atlantic Treaty.
On October 6, 1949, the Congress appropriated slightly
over one billion dollars to be used in assisting the nine signa-
4
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tory powers v.rho had requested milioary aid. The enabling legisla-
tion known as the ifutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 had as
5its stated purpose:
To promote the foreign policy and provide
for the defense and general welfare of the United
States by furnishing military assistance to foreign
nations.
There was a great hue and cry set u\ by certain members of
Congress that strings should be attached to the expenditure of
these funds, but others felt that better relations would obtain if
we placed our trust in our European partners. As it eventuated,
very few restrictive provisions were included in the law, but the
desired restraints were secured in the bilateral treaties which
were later negotiated with the recipient countries.
The most important and controversial provisions of the bi-
lateral agreements were the following:
(a ) Security . To safeguard United States class-
ified material in the manner prescribed for
its security under United States Law.
(b) vlilitary Assistance Group. To receive an
agreed upon number of United States military
personnel for an indefinite period of time,
5
Public Law 329, 81st Congress, Approved October 6, 1949.
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and to make available to them such facilities
as necessary for observation and assistance of
the military forces of the country.
(c) Financial Support. To provide local currency
to defray all administrative costs of the
United States ililitary Assistance Groups.
(d) military Require. tents . To raise and maintain
the requisite number of military units to ab-
sorb and efficiently utilize the military
equipment furnisher by the United States under
the Military Aid irogram.
(e) Ifatual Assistance . To render such military
aid to other members of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization as practicable within the
limits of the country 1 s resources.
As will be shown later, serious problems in human relations
grew out of the provisions of the bilateral treaties. Never before
in modern world history had sovereign n tions relaxec, the barriers
of nationalism to the extent made necessary by the 2iutual Defense
Program. Conversely, never before in modern history had these na-
tions been in such deadly peril. Limited loss of sovereignity was
the price of survival.

6Public Law 329, the privisions of the bilaterd treaties,
and implementing instructions of the State and Defense Departments
provided the Military Assistance Advisory Groups in each country
with their objectives. Briefly, they were the following:
(a) To requisition, receive and transfer title
of military equipment within the approved
material programs of the recipient country,
(b) To assist the country in drawing up material
programs for ensuing y .ars.
(c) To screen country programs against criteria
established by the United States Joint Chiefs
of Staff, the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion, and regional planning groups.
(d) To furnish such training assistance as re-
quested by the recipient country, and as con-
sidered appropriate to implement the material
program.
(e) To observe an; ro ort on the efficiency of end-
use of United States equipment by the armed
forces of the recipi nt country.
Here again were sown the seeds of controversy. According
to their terms of reference, the American military representatives





the country; also, they were to insure the safety of classified
material in the hands of foreign nationals. Legally speaking, the
requisite authority to do this was contained jn the bilateral agree-
ments, but what if the country authorities simply refused to open
up for inspection? V/hat recourse did the United States represent-
atives have? The recourse was to recommend to the President that
military aid to the country be discontinued. Suppose this type of
action took place on a grand scale, what then became of the Mutual
Defense Program? The entire pro Tram might fail even though both
parties were in the rirht. A sovereign nation has a totality of
rights within its boundaries j by the same token, United States re-
presentatives would be acting in, accordance with the bilateral
treaties. No, it was not a question of who was right or who had
the authority, it wa» basically a matter of establishing good hu-
man relations through which objectives could be achieved by mutual
good will and cooperation.
The Military Assistance Groups were composed of Army, Navy,
and Air Force personnel, usually stationed, for purposes of con-
venience, in the capitol city of the country involved. In some
countries the co manding officer of the combined group was an Army
General, in others a Navy Admiral, or Air Force General. The human
relations difficulties which arose: in these combined groups resulted




8antipathies. The harmony and friendly atmosphere of the social
life was in marked contrast to the spirit of rivalry that existed
in the formal organisation.

PART I
THE IMPACT OF THE PROGRAM ON
AMERICAN SPECIAL INTEREST GHOUiS

10
The Mutual Defense Assistance Program created new problems
in human relations between executive agencies of the government as
well as within the agencies themselves. Control of the program
carried with it increased powers for the controlling agency.
It is but a step from the desire for
possession to the desire i'or power. Just as
in primitive society the man with a weapon or
tool was stronger than he whose stren;^bh con-
sisted solely of his wits and bare hands, so
in modern civilization the individual with
extensive possessions is more powerful than
the one who lias few or none. That is to say,
the forner can do more things.
^
So it is with people acting in ptouds. The one billion dollars
already appropriated for the first year' t T&m» | lus the ad-
ditional billions likely to be voted in future y ars, dangled
like the proverbial sugar plum before the eyes of Gtate, Defense,
and ECA. Agencies not wishing to be trampled in the rush moved
quicljy out of the way. ECA realized that its days were numbered,
since the Economic Cooperation ro ram had long since passed its
zenith. The State Departraent was still rankled over the fact
that ECA had wangled independert missions abroad. The Defense
Department, above all, had a special axe to grind. The Mutual
El ore Peterson and E. Grosvenor Plowman, Business Or -anization












Defense Assistance Program would provide an untold number of de-
sirable European billets for the Army, Navy, and Air Force who were
hard pressed at the time to provide jobs for their officers and en-
listed personnel at home. Moreover, administrative control of
these additional billions opened up whole new vistas of spending
power and personnel expansion. Is it any wonder that human rela-
tions problems became the first concern of the administration in
effectuating the pro,Tram?
The President wisely placed control of the overall program
in the hands of one department—State. This was done over the loud
protests of the Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, who felt that
State did not have the necessary qualifications to manage a defense
program. The decision was a good one, however, because it placed
all American representatives in -ach foreign country under the con-
trol of the traditional Chief of Ilission—the Ambassador. The ECA
had very little to say on the subject and appeared to be more than
a little grateful for this new lease on life. The wrangling between
agencies ceased as a result of the ^resident's decision, but the
turnoil within the Department of Defense was only beginning.
Unification of the three armed services wa3 accomplished,
ostensibly, by x,he National Security Act of 1947 > which, "





under civilian control, but not to merge them "
It is heresy for a member of the armed services to suggest tht
the battle for supremacy still rages within the Department of
Defence, but newspaper columnists are under no such inhibitions.
Five years after passage of the National Security Act the well
known columnists, Joseph and Stewart Alsop, referring to a picture
3
which appeared in Life Magazine, had this to say:-^
The photograph showed an Air Force GenercJL
proudly planting a tlMg on an island of floating
ice in the Arctic. The flag was not the American
flag. It was the flag of the United States Air
Force. The flag planting ceremony represented no
victory over an enemy of this country. It ropr
sented a victory over the United States Navy, which
had been racing the Air Force to reach the ice is-
land first. This disease is the blind and. bitter
rivalry between the services.
So much for the peace that reigns in the Department of Defense.
As to who should administer the lion's share of the pro-
gram, the Navy and Air Force reluctantly agreed that the Army was
the logical choice, since the bulk of the aid was aimed at the
creation of ground forces in Europe. In the words of General
Omar Bradley, "European manpower will fori the hard core of our
combined defense effort." Neither did the other two s rvices ob-
2
Public Law 253, 80th Congress, Approved 26 July 1947.




ject when the Department of the Army was designated as the
"Executive Agent" of the Defense Department, to coordinate the
efforts of the three services. The suspicion was not long in
arising, however, that the Army had something in mind beyond mere
coordination; the idea of an "Army Operation" was rapidly takitig
hold. The Navy and Air Force having conceded the role of Execu-
tive Agent to the Array, had no intention of sublimating their
identities or their prerogatives in a so-called Army Operation.
The problem was resolved in the following manner. The Joint Chiefs
of Staff, after some debate, finally compromised the situation by
issuing a paper which limited the power of the Array to matters of
overall military interest, reserving a measure of independence for
the other two services in adninisterirr- their own personnel, mater-
ial, and technical matters. Although this solved the surface problem,
particularly in the Pentagon, it did not blunt the suspicions of the
personnel assigned to duty abroad. They felt, and with some justif-
ication, as events later roved, that the Army would attempt to
assume complete control once the ,<~roups were isolated in remote
foreign communities.
The first contingent of the American iiilitary ^Iission to
Belgium, consisting of one Army Colonel, one Array Lieutenant Colonel,




mission, as the advance group, was to set up the offices and ad-
ministrative arrangements for the succeeding echelons to come.
It is interesting to note that only one officer of the advance
roup belonged to a service other than the Army. There would,
in fact, have been three officers from the Army except for the
emphatic insistance of the senior Naval Officer that the Wavy be
represented in the advance group. Unfortunately the Chief of the
Air lorce section was too junior to demand that he be similarly
represented. The first step taken was to distribute office space
in the buildin?- assigned by the American Embassy to the three
services. This was quietly attended to by the two Army officers
who quite naturally assigned all of the desirable spaces to the
Army section. The Naval officer, when he became aware of this
situation, was confronted by a fait acompli . ./hen he insisted on
a more equitable distribution of space for the Naval and Air
Force sections he came face to face with the realities of military
life—Colonels are senior to Commanders es])ecially when there are
two Colonels to one Commander. This clash of interests seems com-
paratively trivial, but the important thing involved was working space
rather than prestige.
Of primary importance is the environment
within which an employee or executive performs his
duties. It includes conditions of health, comfort,
decency and convenience.^"
Elmore Peterson and E. Crosvenor Plowman, Business Organization aqd
Management
, (Chicago: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1949, revised edition) 309.
•tln-
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The fir3t step on the ladder of poor human relations between the
three services had been taken.
Loyalty between seniors and juniors in any kind of enter-
prise is a factor of prime importance in establishin ood human
5
relations. As Peterson and Plowman put it:
"Morale" denotes confidence and loyalty
to superiors. Obviously a subordinate cannot be
loyal to a superior in office when he feels un-
certain about the latter 1 s authority. Conversely,
an executive finds himself in a difficult it' not
inimical position when he seeks to stimulate con-
fidence and develop loyalty in persons when he is
not sure they are responsible to him.
The ,-uestion of confidence and loyalty arose to plagM the
Naval representative of the advance rroup prior to the arrival of
his commanding officer in Brussels. The Army Commandin- General
of the combined group suggested in confidence to this Naval officer
:t he might become Chief of the Naval Section if he a.^eed to sub-
rait certain recommendations to his parent service in Washington.
The recommendation the General desired him to submit was the
following: "A preliminary survey of the local situation indicates
that there is no need for calling forward a senior Navy Captain as





himself in a most awkward position. The implications of the pro-
position were clear. The General desired a junior officer who
would be more amenable to his suggestions than a senior Naval
cain. To which superior did this junior officer owe his
loyalty? He was responsible to both. At the cost of establish-
in poor human relations with his Commanding General, the Naval
officer declined to submit the reouested recommendation, and re-
ported the incident to his senior officer upon his arrival at the
post
,
Esprit de corps has been long recognized as a synonym for
morale or pride in service. This esprit
,
de corps is an emotional
factor which strongly colors the attitude of personnel of the
three services, lb is dangerous from a human relations point of
view to ignore it, i eterson and Plowman say that:
Situations involving emotions ;md attitudes
constantly arise between groups of workers. To
i.cnore them, resist them, or to fail even to rec -
nize them will lead to mistakes and sometimes to
disaster.
Administration of the joint military headquarters in
Brussels had been taken over by Array personnel. Orders and in-





format and Array language. Customs and traditions of the other two
services in matters of protocol, phraseology, and references to
regulations were completely ignored. If the situation had not
contained certain elements of humor it would have had a devastating
effect upon morale. For example: there were instructions to the
Naval section to give its estimate of "Division Slice" for ships
and fleets, reference was made to Naval "troop or'sanitations and
tables of equipment," or requests for compliance with Army Regula-
tion so and so. The crowning blow was delivered by certain well
meaning, but ignorant, Amy sergeants of the administrative office
who addressed senior Naval officers as "Colonel," and Navy Chief
Petty Officers as "sergeant." The end effect of this insensitivity
toward pride of service was to strengthen the unity within service
groups and emphasize the lack of unity of the whole. As evidence
of the desire to retain its identity the Naval section meticulously
referred to floors as decks, stairways as ladders, walls as bulk-
heads, pillars as stanchions, coffee as jaraoke, and the drinking
fountain as the scuttlebut.
7On the subject of cooperation, Newman said:'
A person is more likely to understand and
su port an action he has helped plan, V/hatever
7
William H. Newman, Administrative Action
,
("Jew York: Prentice-






the explanation, this deBire for participation is
prevalent and becomes increasingly strong among
competent and self-reliant people.
Perhaps the answer to the foregoing problem is contained
in these ;.'ords. Good will and cooperation mi^ht well have replaced
resentment in carryin'* out orc'ers if the Army had recognized the
situation as one requiring consultation with its sister services.
In government service, whether it be civilian in nature or
military, status or relative rank is measured by: the number of
people controlled, the amount of money administered, and corollary
to these two, loudness of voice in council. Robert Du^in, writing
p-
on human relations in administration, stated that:
Status is always evident la a system of
rankings there is no such thing as
solitary status. There always have to be two
individuals or groups to compare. Furthermore,
tho comparison has to result in the conclusion
that one is "better," "higher," "more important,"
than the other.
The inter-service "pecking order" in Brussels MM estab-
lished as follows: (l) Arty, (2) Navy, and (3) Air Force. This
order was based principally on the dollar values of their respec-
tive pro rams. Now, at the risk of incurring the wrath of the
8 /Robert Dubin, Human Relations in Administration
,
(New York:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951) 254.
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powers that be, the writer makes the daring observation that the
Air Force was never one to remain long in the position of low
chicken in the pecking order. It would be even more daring to
describe the series of maneuvers by which the Air -Force section
moved itself into second place in the local hierarchy of serv-
ices. Suffice it to say that this was clone in the interest of
status, but at the cost of ^ood human relations.
Perhaps the trivial incidents which have been used to
illustrate the human relations problems of the Military Assistance
Group have tended to over-emphasize the magnitude of that problem.
Actually the situation was no more serious than the day to day
frictions arising in any enterprise involving human actions and
reactions. The fact that these problems were recognized and
overcome speaks well for the officials charged with supervision of
the pro ram. "Solving and remedying a grievance is one of the
o
greatest challenges any supervisor meets." Sounding boards for
airing rievances were established by order of the Commanding
General in the form of committees. Among these committees were:
(a) unlisted men's committee, composed of en-
9 Willard E. J arker and Robert Iff, Kliemeier, Human Relations in
Supervision
,












listed representatives of the three services.
Its purpose was to bring before the Command-
ing General any matter having to do with wel-
fare, recreation, or family problems.
(b) An executive committee composed of the execu-
tive officers of the three services. This
committee dealt with any matters of inter-
service interest, human relations, and opera-
tional problems of joint interest.
(c) Civilian grievance :tee. This committee
had as members, both civilian and officer re-
presen atives of the three services. It heard
and attempted to reconcile any type of griev-
ance brought before it by civilian employees.
Difficult cases were referred to the Command-
ing General.
In addition to the above committees, the Commandinc General de-
clared himself available on a twenty-four hour basis to hear com-
plaints by any member of the organization. Obviously it was not
possible to remove the fundamental causes for inter—service
.
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rivalry—this will come only with years of unification—but much
of the surface friction was removed by the application of the
principles of cood human relations.
IS"
PART II
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS iROBLEM

23
Thinking Americans at home are becoming increasingly con-
cerned about the criticism voiced abroad of our countrymen, for
high living, "boondoggling," arrogance, and ingrained "gookism."
In one of her colums, ilalvina Lindsay stated: 1
Some of thos experienced in recruitment
of foreign employees believe there are certain
attitudes that should especially be taboo in
select in- foreign service personnel. One is the
feeling that a great sacrifice is being made to
work overseas and th t foreign people should be
grateful to Uncle San for sendinr the worker to
them. Another is a naive sense of superiority
to foreign ways. This i also in re-
fusal to tother learning the foreign language.
Still another is the missionary zeal to "make
people over in our own ioare." One o; the chief
criticisms of Americans working abroad is th t
their standards of living are too high.
These attitudes contributed, among other things, to poor
human relations between the American liilitary (Jroup and the
Belgians. There were wide divergences, not only in our respec-
tive ways of life, but in our military traditions, technical apti-
tudes, and methods of doing business.
Oficially speaking, the way had been cleared for placing
the ro ram in effect in Belgium. The objectives and scope of the
lvina Lindsay, High Livers Abroad
,
A Lon/^; Range Issue f The






program were clear to both sides, the Military Assistance Qroup
knew its mission and the bilateral treaty ostensibly removed any
obstacles to extraterritorial operations. The only factor which
ha> not been taken into account was human relations. As it turned
out, this factor was the single one upon which the success or fail-
ure of the entire pro Tram depended. If a graph could be drawn, it
would show that the progress or the program varied in direct pro-
portion to the pro.ress of good human relations. Specifically,
what were the obstacles to good human relations? In the writer's
opinion, they might be listed in the following order of importance:
(a) European suspicion of the philosophy behind
the Military Aid iTograin.
(b) Differential in the relative standards of
livir
.
(c) .futual lack of understating of the other's
way of life, habits, and culture.
(d) American worship of efficiency and technocracy
versus European preoccupation with tradition.
(e) European jealousy of American prosperity, world
leadership, and "bigness."
Many well inforued Americans have written off the accusa-
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mnist propaganda. This is not entirely true. There is a deep
seated suspicion in the minds of many non-communist Europeans that
the United States plans to let them bear the brunt of the fighting,
death, and destruction in a fixture war. They believe we are it-
tempting to buy protection wi&h collars. They have lived and died
through two recent wars vnd. occupations of their own lands and
cities. tfc hAVI never seen war in our homeland. They are tired
and discouraged. Many have voiced the belief that they are now so
orienced at being occupied that they have nothing new to learn
from the Russians along these lines. Some are in favor of making
a deal v;ith the Russians because the outcome is inevitable anyway.
This philosophy permeates the thinki: 11 Belgians to a greater
or lesser extent, Including even the milita y. They are willing
to fight if armed, but they will vdth one eye on the eneirgr
and one eye on the escape hatch. This attitude accounted for their
lack of enthusiasm in welcoming their American comrades in arms
and the material aid they offered. An important put of our job
then was to convince bite Belgian! of the sincerity of our motives
the determination of cur country to stick with them in body as
well as in spirit. In case of an attack, there was no question of
our evacuation; we planned to stay and join our efforts with theirs.
M
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The differential in living standards was not conducive to
that intiiacy or informality between co-workers that is so essential
in the acc'j : lishment of rnrtual tasks. "Emoluments, perquisites and
privileges are highly important evidences of status and are often
2
highly valued." The Chinese word for it is "face." The difference
in the pecuniary status of tin Americans and Belgians constituted a
serious inpediment to good r 1... ions. This diffe ence was reflected
in the clothes v/e wore, in our offices, in our social life, in our
habitations, and in the cars wo 'rove. The Belgians found themselves
apologising for the austerity of their entertainment, the brand of
irettes they smoked, the modest homes they lived in, and the
frigid temperature of their offices. Unfortunately, it was impos-
sible for i eric :.n group to lower their own emoluments or to re-
duc .r customary stan ards of living to bring them in line with
their college, s, but it I braaaly important to minimise these
'erences and to avoid any display of ostentabion.
By confining our entertainment to the simple things, such
i rti tions to the local canals,
inoxpen: i/e suppara at country inns, and ood conversation over a
2
Chaster . . riard, "Functions of Status Systems in For 1 ^ r ^an-
izations," Human Relations in Administration, ed. by Robert Dubin
(New r ork: Identice-uall, Inc., 1951) 258.
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bottle of wine we received an ii mediate warm response that extended
itself later to natters of business.
Another tendency is to accept without
question certain assumed facts or modes of be-
havior. A businessman from Japan, for example,
explained with considerable insight the reaction
of people in his country to American salesmanshl .
Generally, he said, the Americans tried to follow
the same technicues of selling in his country as
were effective in the United States; the same
neatness of dress, • feasant, persuasive manner,
desire to close the sal© promptly, and so forth.
In his country the importance attached to little
courtesies as contrasted with personal dress -:.nd
other aspects of social relationships were differ-
ent.-*
Much time is lost in iiel^ium in shaking hands. It is cus-
tomary to shake hands with each person at a large meeting, no matter
how well you know him, both upon arrival and departure from the
meeting. Americans may feel this to be a waste of time, but woe
to the individual uho ifiiores the custom, i/hen an appointment is
made for two o'clock, it may take pi cc t three, four, or five, or
perhaps not at all. It is best to accept this habit philosophi-
es lly because that is the way it has been done from tine immemorial
and the way it will be for some time to come, -iany Americans took
this custom to be a display of silent contempt or downright bad
.illiam H. Newman, Administrat ^ion, The Techniques of organi-
zation and .fona.qenent
.
(T^ew York: Irentice-llall, Inc., 1951) 109.
I
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manners. Americans, generally speaking, have a deep sense of kind-
ness, genuine pood manners, and humanity underneath a rather rough
surface. Europeans, on the other hand, place more importance on
the visual display of courtesy, flowery language, and superficial
warmth, while suffering inwardly from a lack of these attributes.
It was necessary, therefore, for both sides to make certain adjust-
ments to arrive at an acceptable working relationship.
While on the subject of oiverse cultures, the matter of
languar-eLi deserves mention. A language is more than a vehicle for
expression, it is a reflection of pride in nationality, A native
of France would not speak Trench if he were not proud of being a
Frenchman. One of the first indications of the upsurge in national-
ism in Germany prior to both world Jars was the anger shown by
Berliners toward anyone who spoke a language other than German in
public. The Americans in Brussels irritated many Belgians by their
insistence on using the English ll&giugt at all times. The Belgians
understood that the Americans were poor linguists, and that it
would be hopeless to attempt to do business in French; yet, this
was their country, not the Anericr-ns' . It was found that the most
feeble attempt by an imeric :ji to u:e a French word or phrase occasion-
ally was rewarded by cheers, backslapping, anu cries of "tres iiagnifique?"




Scott insisted that technocracy Was purely American, and
he warned " ifo theory of social action or
rovornance now existinr or ro
;
osed in Europe, could in any way
be endemic to that unique set-up of geologic conformation, tech-
4
nique, equipment, and personnel peculiar to Worth America."
It is baffling to most Americans to find that Europeans
are satisfied ;.rith doing things the same way their grandfathers
did. As one Belgian officer put it, "AH the people who were dis-
satisfied with the way things were done in Europe have Ion;' since
e to America, the ones vrtio remain are satisfied." ..hen we have
a job to do, especially a hard or unpleasant one, we go about it in
a hurry, we face the unpleasant Tacts, find a solution, and apply
it. The Belgians, on the other hand, approach their work with the
idea that work is only one small phase of life—if it <..oesn f t get
done today, we may be sure it Han't run away—it will be waiting
for us there tomorrow.
Technically, we found the Belgian Uavy more or less pre-
historic. They trained their men in pulling boats on the canals,
in the rituals of in; antry trill, and in tying knots. They had not
rd much about radar controlled rapid fire guilSj anti-submarine
Howard Scott, "Introduction to Technocracy," Administra.ti.on. The
t and Science of >/r. ;anigation and .iaiiago. tent , edited by Albert






warfare, or the latest minesweepin/^ gadgets, -They hate'' having to
admit their ignorance and resented the presence of cabbie, profes-
sional :.aval officers in their midst. In an effort to bring them
up to date, many high powered enlisted .lists were imported
from the United States liavy to train their men and officers in the
use of new equipment. These specialists had many frustrating, but
humorous experiences working with the Belgian Navy. The experience
of one of our .runners is illustrative of the sort of thing we were
.inst,
Thlf gunner was attempting to supervise the installation
of a battery of rapid fire, power driven guns on one of the Bel-
gian ships, a job thc.t ordinarily should have taken only a few
weeks. After six months of delay, he was taken to task by the
Chief of the ilaval Assistance Group, Fhe iinner explained the
delay as follows. ..ork each day commenced at about nine o'clock.
By the time he had his tools assemi led and rounded up his crew, all
hands knocked off for corning soup, work re-commenced at about ten-
thirty. At eleven o'clock all hcinds laiocked off to wash up for lunch
at eleven-thirty. Two hours for lunch and back to work at one-
thir.y. Break out the toolt; and assemble crew. All heads loiock off
an hour later for afternoon tea. At three-thirty re—coritnence work,






time at five o'clock. The -Tinner had become reconciled to the
daily routine, but it was the holidays and leave periods that
rc.lly hurt. These consisted of religious holidays, mandatory
leave ] periods, etc., that took precedence over any other v/ork,
even of n emergency nature.
Any technical problem, no matter how trivial, soon as-
sumed monumental proportions. In estimating schedules, waking
plans, or setting deadlines, the American was wise who multiplied
his normal expectancy by a factor of two to three. let, to ignore
the indiginous customs and habits of work was to court disaster
as far as accomplishment of he aid pro ram was concerned, per-
haps the most difficult hurdle taken by the Americans in maintain-
ing -ood human relations was the shift to low gear recuired of them
in matters of efficiency and technocracy.
Alexis De Toccueville, a nineteenth century observer of
5
the American scene, said of the American citizen:
He takes
•
ride in the glory of his nation;
he boasts of its success, to which he conceives him-
self to have contributed; anc he rejoices in the
general prosterity by which he profits. The feeling
he entertains towards the State is analogous to that
which unites him to his family, and it is by a kind
of selfishness that he interests himself in the wel-
fare of hi3 country.
5
' Alexis De Tocqueville, "Democracy in America," Ad.iinjstrat ion
,
The Art and Science of Organization and llanago lent , edited by
Albert Lepawsky iork: All . iinopf , 1949) 350.
•
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If this was a fair evaluation of the ., rican in 1331 when
the United States was but a flecgling auong nations, what ..mat be
the thought of a European observer today? America has fallen heir
to world leadership by virtue of her great economic and military
power, willingly or otherwise the rest of the free world has been
forced to accept this leadership or succumb to the forces of fear
and darkness which press upon it from every side, Whether this
leadership is rood or not, remains to be seen.
One needs only to travel briefly in England or on the Con-
tinent to feel the .jealousy and hate engendered in those countries
by the prosperity and might of the United States. Economic aid,
military aid, and I oint Four are not received in a spirit of
thanksgiving, but are taken in the manner of the poor relative
acce ting largess from the wealthy uncle.
In Belgium, the Military Aid Group frecuently were driven
to exasperation by repeated references to "your rreat and wealthy
country; we a e only a poor sMil country; certainly a little more
aid would not be felt by you." On more than one occasion an Amer-
ican officer was impelled to remark that lie was a taxpayer, too.
It was evident that the ielgians did not look upon the aid program
any sacrifice whatever to the American people.




ship was a horse of an entirely different color. The attitude of
England i3 representative of most European countries, including
Belgium. They had armies and navies back in the days when we were
struggling to settle a country. Therefore, they look upon us today
as Johnny-come—latelys in the game of leadership and military pro-
ficiency. The sad truth of the matter is, however, that most of
these countries have spent so much time under occupation that they
are years behind us in every phase of modern warfare.
Human relations frequently became strained to the breaking
point in matters which had to do with the adoption of American
strategy, tactics, and techniques. For example, American military
equipment is frequently designed to fit the tactical employment of
forces. The tables of organization and equipment must be so ar-
ranged as to provide for proper utilization, repair, and maintenance
of the equipment. It became apparent early in the game that the
Belgian military formations were not suitable for American equip-
ment. It was suggested, therefore, that their Army, Navy, and Air
Force adopt the American organization en toto. Needless to say,
this was indeed a bitter pill to be swallowed by a country steeped
in its own military traditions for hundreds of years. Nevertheless,
once the necessity for change had been made clear through the use of
patience and tact, it was accepted in good faith.
#vi
ax&




All of this is a far cry from the dictatorial methods
used behind the Iron Curtain. Our methods have been democratic
in the extreme, and we have learned that the best way is the hard
way. "If these tasks of human relations seem challenging indeed,
they may not by that token put us on the defensive. The totali-
tarian of right or left have yet to prove that their prohibitions
upon the familiar conflicts yield any completely cooperative
people."
Benjamin xM. Selekman, Labor Relations and Human Relations . (New






Rear Admiral Miles, Chief of the Foreign Missions Division
of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, once said that the
promotion of .?ood human relations with our allies is worth more to
us than a hundred ship loads of armor and armament, because without
good will, material aid will avail us nothing. .<e learned the
truth of these words many times over in dealing with our Belgian
friends. Nothing can be more frustrating than becoming enmeshed
in customs, traditions, and points of view which have no meaning
for us j which contribute nothing to our joint objective. Yet no-
thing is so rewarding as the accomplishment of one's mission by the
use of salesmanship, diplomacy, tact, and the effort to see the
other fellow 1 8 point of view.
If the American Military Aid Group had attempted to force
its way through the morass of old world tradition, resistance to
change and governmental red tape, it is doubtful that anything
would ever have been accomplished beyond arousing even greater
antipathy. It is true that the North Atlantic Treaty, the Mutual
Defense Act, and the bilateral treaties taken together did provide
a measure of force, yet to have used this weapon would have been
fatal to the success of our venture.
By studying our allies and learning about the things that





We found that they were people just like ourselves, they suffered
when their pride was hurt, they needed to maintain face, and they
were willing to go a long way under the right kind of urging.
The foreign aid programs of the United States are placing
an increasingly great number of American citizens in contact with
Europeans. These programs will succeed or fail depending not upon
their content, but upon the people who administer them. As Malvina
Lindsay warns: "More of what is called 'World Orientation' of
people is needed, whether they go abroad or stay home. For in
either case they are sure of having to adapt more and more to
people unlike themselves." Whatever success is achieved by the
Mutual Defense Assistance Pro;Tam, in promoting the welfare of the
United States through aid to foreign countries, will, be accomplished
primarily through the practice of ~ood human relations.
Malvina Lindsay, "High Liver3 Abroad. A Long Range Issue. " The
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